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Introduction
Nations, languages, or states are so much part and parcel of the 
world in which we live nowadays that we hardly ever spare them a 
thought. These categories appear “transparent” to us, the “natural” 
building blocks1 from which our (social) world is composed, or—more 
aptly—constructed.2 Scholarly literature frequently suggests that a con-
figuration of these three elements is the cornerstone of nationalism, or 
the sole ideology of statehood and peoplehood legitimation in today’s 
world after the completion of decolonization and following the breakup 
of the ideologically nonnational polity of the Soviet Union in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century. From the human perspective today’s 
world is made of nation-states; the planet’s all inhabited and habitable 
landmass neatly apportioned among the extant polities.
In this study, first, I aspire to “de-naturalize” the categories of 
nation, (a) language,3 and state (but I exclude from the analysis substate, 
suprastate, or “not-state-endowed” nations and nationalisms). On this 
basis, I reflect on ethnic nationalism as a subspecies of the ideology 
of nationalism. According to common opinion, ethnic nationalism is 
quite closely, though in a largely undefined and vague manner, asso-
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ciated with Central (and Eastern) Europe.4 In this pattern of things, 
the importance of language is customarily emphasized, often by ref-
erence to the seminal but rather rambling work Ideen zur Philosophie 
der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1784-91 (Outlines of a Philosophy of the 
History of Man, 1800)5 by the prenational East Prussian scholar based 
in Russia’s Livonia, Johann Gottfried Herder.6 Yet it is not to deny that 
later national activists and thinkers, again, especially in Central Europe, 
did use some of Herder’s ideas for postulating and pursuing their pet 
national projects.7 
Be that as it may, the exact features of the three aforementioned 
categories and the relations among them are rarely elaborated in any 
systematic manner. The intuition on the presumed importance of lan-
guages in ethnic nationalism (that verges on being a kind of unanalyzable 
tacit knowledge)8 does not yield any analytical insight beyond drawing 
examples from Central (and Eastern) Europe and proposing, mostly on 
this unrepresentative sample, generalizations on (ethnic) nationalism 
as a global ideology.9 Hence, for the sake of clarity and to avoid confu-
sion, I propose to speak consistently of “ethnolinguistic nationalism” 
when referring to this type of national ideology whose cornerstone is 
a language.
Second, and most importantly, there is no clear-cut definition of 
what ethnolinguistic nationalism is, differences being often vast among 
specific cases of nation-states that employ this ideology or its elements. 
Authors, by basing their definitions on this or that nation-state, by 
default exclude cases of other national polities from the remit of their 
pet definitions. In such a situation, it appears that the best course of 
action is to come up with a definition that is deduced from the observed 
practices of how ethnolinguistic nationalism is actually implemented 
and maintained. In turn, it seems that the geographical spread of the 
aforesaid practices may be postulated to be coterminous with where 
Central Europe is believed to be located. 
Third, and crucially for this study, an analytical instrument (that is, 
the “normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state”) for check-
ing whether or not this or that nationalism of a given nation-state is of 
ethnolinguistic character, should enable researchers to attain a higher 
degree of precision in their pronouncements, making their findings 
comparable on a formalized footing. Personally, I believe that Central 
Europe’s ethnolinguistic nationalisms constitute a somewhat peculiar 
case, from which it may be altogether erroneous to generalize about 
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all other nationalisms extant across the globe. Last but not least, in the 
conclusion, I propose that at present there are two clusters of ethno-
linguistic (“isomorphic”) nation-states on Earth, namely, one in Central 
Europe and another in Southeast and East Asia. No such isomorphic 
nation-state is to be found outside Eurasia.
The Categories of Nation, (a) Language, and State
The concepts “nation,” “(a) language” and “state,” interlocked with one 
another, are synonymous with (Western-inspired) modernity, or with the 
sociopolitical order of the world in which we live at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. But not so long ago, in the mid-nineteenth century, 
these concepts were utterly unknown to most humans. Indeed, the West 
(or more exactly, a handful of Western European powers, together with 
Russia) had dominated much of the globe since the sixteenth century. 
But this domination was not absolute, as such important non-Western 
regional powers as the Ottoman Empire, the Mughal Empire, or China 
continued to be reckoned with. What is more, much of the inhabited 
and habitable territory stayed outside the reach and control of the West-
ern and non-Western polities.
States
The phenomenon is best observed on European maps of Africa before 
the Berlin Conference (1884–85) opened a “scramble” for this continent. 
Earlier, European colonizers had kept to the coastal areas, leaving the 
African interior to its own devices. In addition, they also speciously 
maintained that the sub-Saharan section of the continent contained 
“no native state organisms.”10 This was typical of the European per-
ception of matters political in Africa. In reality, humans always—and in 
this case, naturally (the Homo sapiens sapiens being a par excellence 
social species)— live in groups and in one way or another develop a 
sociopolitical organization that prevails on a given territory, which is a 
basic definition of what statehood is about.11
For instance, in Europe, statehood is recognized in the case of the 
Vatican City State, with the population of a mere 800 people living on 
the territory of less than half a square kilometer. Likewise, Liechtenstein 
and Monaco with the populations of 35,000 each, the former enjoying 
the territory of 160 sq km, while the latter is squeezed to the area of 
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2 sq km, are not denied the status of state. But in reality all the three 
examples are not that different, in populace or territory, from an average 
precolonial African village or a lineage group led by a headperson.12 
It appears that human groups up to about 150 members are genu-
inely “natural.” They coalesce and are maintained spontaneously thanks 
to what the humanity is as a species from a biological and evolutionary 
perspective.13 Beyond that all human groups, including those cotermi-
nous or contained within states, are constructed, “invented,” or in other 
words, “imagined” into being.14 Additionally, the type of state, which 
is nowadays considered to be “normal,” is that of “sovereign territorial 
polity.”15 Such a territorial state (Territorialstaat) became an increasingly 
popular model of statehood organization in mid-seventeenth- century 
Europe in the wake of the Thirty Years’ War that had dramatically rear-
ranged the basis of statehood and its legitimation in Western and Central 
Europe.16 Afterward, the European colonial empires spread this model 
of sovereign territorial state across the world,17 or rather imposed it from 
above and afar without much regard for local political traditions or 
wishes. The as yet not colonized polities—such as Abyssinia (Ethiopia) 
or Siam (Thailand)—had to reshape themselves in accordance with this 
model in order to survive as independent polities. By embarking on the 
course of such prescribed “modernization,” the two countries proved 
that they did not require any “civilizing” (read “colonial annexation”) 
to be provided by a Western empire.18 The uniformization, or standard-
ization, of statehood organization across the globe is as much a Western 
imposition as a Western invention.19 
Nations
The North and South American revolutions, alongside the French rev-
olution, did away with the divine legitimation of rule, placing this role 
in a given polity’s (ideally, entire) population, renamed in this function 
as “nation.” The subsequent coupling of the nation, seen as “contents,” 
with the sovereign territorial state, playing the role of a spatial “con-
tainer” (or in other words, a set of territorially specific principles that 
spawn and maintain a polity) gave rise to the nation-state. Nowadays, 
each polity (with the rare exception of the Vatican City State), in order 
to be seen as legitimate, must be a nation-state, or a state for one nation 
only.
In this normative insistence, nationalism became the first-ever 
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“infrastructural” ideology of the entire human world. The stunning 
success of this ideology, accepted at present quite unquestioningly by all 
as “normal,” created a standardized arena onto which human relations 
are simultaneously channeled and at which they are played out. Ideally, 
this “playing out” of the relations ought to happen among states and 
within them.20
In the concept “nation-state,” received opinion agrees on the basic 
definition of the latter element, unlike in the case of the former. Authori-
ties, and among them, scholars and politicians alike, offer widely differing 
definitions of what the “nation” is or may be. The exasperation entailed 
by this inconclusive discussion on the subject is such that researchers 
propose to look beyond the very essentialism of defining “things” or 
“entities,” in order to transcend the tyranny of “groupism.”21 However, 
the “groupness” of human groups is a fact that is best acknowledged, 
and it is not beyond explication.22 Where the difficulty lies is how the 
concept of nation is (ab)used. 
Quite unconsciously, we play all kind of mind games with the term 
“nation,” applying it (invariably as a group or its members) as we see fit 
and in line with this or that group’s interest, because actually so much is 
at stake: (normatively legitimate) power itself. As mentioned above, the 
“nation” replaced divine sanction as the source and ultimate provider of 
statehood legitimation. In this process a bit of “divine mystery” rubbed 
off onto the very concept of nation. Dispelling it would disenchant the 
mystique of state building and maintaining; a step too far that could 
shatter the rhetorical power of the word “nation” so badly needed for 
legitimizing polities in the eyes of its inhabitants. Without this vague 
mystique of togetherness denoted by the term “nation,” emotions and 
feelings are suddenly drained away from the concept of state, leaving 
it for what it is: an empty rhetorical shell, an abstract and arbitrary 
legal construct imposed on, and/or accepted by or wished for, a given 
population. The population in question, rebranded as “nation,” grows 
accustomed to this construct of state, and people learn to consider it as 
“their own.” As a result, a nation-state is born (if I am allowed to borrow 
this cliché stemming from the nationalist vocabulary).
The difficulty of defining the term “nation” lies in its arbi-
trary, diverse, vague, and emotional use(s) and application(s). The 
11,000-strong Tuvaluans and the 1.4 billion Chinese are considered to be 
nations, which—as cloaked in the garb of their own national polities—
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(should) enjoy the same rights and privileges in light of international 
law. The same distinction of a full-fledged nation is accorded to the 
Americans (that is, United States citizens) with no national or official 
language in their polity of the United States of America, to the Poles with 
a single national and official language, and to the Indians with their (thus 
far) 26 official languages. But instead of trying to find some presumed 
“common core” of meaning or “trait” shared by all these groups going 
by the name of “nation” in today’s world of nation-states, it may be more 
useful to propose that what makes a human group a nation is merely the 
successful application of the label “nation” to it. When other human 
groups already enjoying the distinction of being “nations” agree that an 
upstart group is a nation, too, as it claims, such an aspirant group does 
become a nation, indeed.
In accordance with the principles of the infrastructural ideology of 
nationalism, attaining the status of nation accords a group—irrespective 
of its size, cohesion, or any other characteristic—with, nowadays, the 
jealously guarded right to its own sovereign statehood. In the recent 
past, there were literally thousands of polities; for instance, almost 600 
in British India alone, or even 5,000 in the Holy Roman Empire.23 In 
the modern world the number of states, though constantly growing at 
a glacial pace since the turn of the twentieth century (when it stood at 
around 40), de facto, has been capped at just above 200. This scarcity 
imbues the label of “nation” with an unprecedented and unique political 
value. The globe sports thousands if not tens of thousands of human 
(usually ethnic) groups,24 but less than a tiny fraction of them have 
achieved recognition as nations. The membership card of this genuinely 
exclusive club of nations disproportionately empowers the very few 
vis-à-vis all the other human groups.
Languages
Like the model of sovereign territorial state and the ideology of nation-
alism, the term “nation” is also of Western origin and making, which is 
readily visible in the Latin etymology of this word ultimately derived 
from the past participle of Latin nasci for “to be born.”25 This clas-
sical root delivered the Medieval Latin term natio for denoting the 
totality of all the (male) members of a polity’s estates with an access to 
political decision-making (other meanings of this term also included, 
for instance, university students coming from a polity or broader geo-
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graphical region within Christian Europe).26 Similarly, the English terms 
“state” and “language” are also derived from Latin.27 The same is true of 
their counterparts in other European languages, though in some cases 
they may be more or less literal translations of the Latin words into 
these languages (for instance, naród, pan´stwo, and je˛zyk for “nation,” 
“state,” and “language” in Polish). Through the conduit of the colonial 
languages of the European imperial powers, the process repeated itself 
in the case of non-European languages when the “norm” of dividing the 
planet’s terra firma among states, and the humanity into nations, often 
complete with their specific languages, was imposed on, and/or adopted 
by, the rest of the world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Before modern times, people in Europe simply spoke to communi-
cate, literacy having been limited to the narrow stratum of literati. With 
the spread of education and literacy in the West, suddenly it turned 
out that communication between speakers was hardly possible unless 
prior to their conversation they agreed on “a language” in which to 
talk.28 By its nature oral and continuous, speaking—or the linguistic 
dimension—became discrete. In the process of modernization, the con-
tinuous linguistic was partitioned into self-contained entities going by 
the generic name of “languages.”
This self-consciousness about talking in languages arose with the 
invention of writing and the possibility of detaching, in space and time, 
the utterance from the speaker and the interlocutor. Before the rise of 
writing, both speaker and interlocutor had to be at the same time in the 
same place within each other’s earshot for an utterance to be success-
fully conveyed from one to the other. With the use of the proverbial 
pen all three may be disconnected in time and space; the necessary 
immediate relation among them was replaced by a formalized “thing,” 
or the medium of a written language. This formalization allowed writers 
to produce “writings” to be easily decodified by readers, as long as they 
were channeled through a given language in accordance with the main 
principles of its formalization (that is, standardization).29 Ever intensi-
fying literacy, characteristic of modernity, spawned the “genre” of stan-
dard language. It is a language whose principles have been meticulously 
described, streamlined and “normativized” in usually state-approved 
grammars, dictionaries and other official material and regulations.30 
The standard language is a language of power, based on the lect31 
of a power center (usually the capital of a polity) as spoken and written 
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by the elite. In the modern state, knowledge of this standard language is 
imparted to all the population via compulsory elementary education. In 
the West languages are opposed to dialects, the main difference between 
them being that of writing and power. The latter are lects that are spoken 
outside power centers and are not commonly committed to paper.32 
The French revolution, as in the case of many other things, also offered 
a political-cum-bureaucratic model of how to obliterate dialects and 
replace them with the national language to be spoken and written by 
all the nation-state’s inhabitants.33
The rise of the nation-state drastically limited the number of recog-
nized and extant polities across the world. Simultaneously, modernity 
(but also religion, for instance in its Protestant variety) required ever 
more intensive and intrusive popular literacy. As a result, the vast major-
ity of lects were condemned to the status of lowly dialects, whereas a 
small number of lects endowed with a fully-fledged written form were 
elevated to the rank of languages. The exigencies of national state-build-
ing and statehood legitimation have required the “regulation” of the 
relationship between languages and dialects. In Europe, it has been 
commonly proposed that dialects spoken on the territory of a polity 
“belong” to the polity’s official language, or should be gathered under its 
“roof.” Ideally, in the process of modernization, compulsory schooling 
should liquidate dialects and replace them with the official language.34
This dichotomy of languages and dialects, as part and parcel of 
modernization, became the norm of thinking about and regulating the 
linguistic dimension in today’s world of nation-states.35 However, as 
mentioned above, though important in many various ways elsewhere, 
languages became the basis of nation-state building and national state-
hood legitimation in Central Europe.36 
Imagining the Normative Concepts of Modernity
The linguistic dimension imagined as and actively altered to consist of 
discrete languages is as much the basis of the modernity as nation-states 
and nations. The spellchecker of the word processor that I am using to 
write this study is set to conform with the “US English” spelling system, 
and when you consult a typical entry in the Anglophone Wikipedia 
the website alerts you that this entry is also available in the 200-odd 
Wikipedias in different languages. At present IT technology is available 
through and supports internet resources in over 600 languages.37 
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As now convincingly established in wide-ranging scholarly discus-
sion since the early 1980s, nations and states are invented and imagined 
into being before they become part of social reality, which we, humans, 
perceive as “our world.” I propose that languages are similarly invented 
and imagined into being.38 The modern world is constructed on the 
foundational building blocks construed to be states, nations, and lan-
guages. In the state-containers, nations (people) live and communicate 
with the use of respective languages. But it is more correct to say that 
the political, the social, and the linguistic dimensions of the modern 
world are normatively forced into the straitjacket of states, nations, and 
languages. Saying it in this way we can immediately tease out the imag-
ined or invented character of these arrangements.
But the discussion is not complete without drawing our attention 
to the fact that as much as this modern “order of things” is man-made 
(imagined), the three categories of “state,” “nation,” and “language” 
were also imagined into being. In the cloying rhetoric of “benign glo-
balization,” it is important to recall that these categories are European 
inventions that the West imposed on the rest of the world.39 All these 
categories and their actualizations are man-made (invented) artifacts 
of culture (that is, they are not products of nature, understood as the 
reality and forces independent of human will).
Conventionally, artifacts of this kind are classified either as “mate-
rial” or “immaterial.” In this case, the aforementioned categories and 
their actualizations belong to the latter set of immaterial entities of cul-
ture. Contrary to popular usage, “immaterial” does not mean that it is 
the stuff of legends with no bearing on the actual (human) world around 
us. Languages, nations, and states are not visible or tactile as entities, 
but they are quite real. Humans act in accordance with their logic and 
produce material things dictated by the “immaterial” existence of these 
entities; for instance, books, border posts, or pantheons. Languages, 
nations, and states are imagined and their existence maintained in the 
heads of people belonging to a given group that uses a given language, 
belonging to this or that nation and living in a nation-state. The actual 
material existence of these “immaterial” entities and their categories 
hinges on their neurally executed image shared across a human group 
or groups.
An extraterrestrial visitor will not be able to see languages, nations, 
or states on earth through a telescope. To detect them, such a visitor 
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would need some device giving it full access to human brains. Otherwise, 
this hypothetical visitor might discern the entities only upon acquiring 
a human language and living among the members of a nation in a state. 
It would have to “go into the field,” to become an anthropologist.
Which Nationalism in Central Europe?
Whenever one opens a monograph on nationalism, in most cases, exam-
ples of this ideology are taken from Central (and Eastern) Europe. Quite 
often the discussion is underpinned by the tacit (and questionable) 
opinion that “the problem of nationalism” occurs only in “the East,” 
meaning the region of Central (and Eastern) Europe. When it is con-
ceded that nowadays the ideology of nationalism also underlies and 
legitimizes nation-states in “the West” (that is, in Western Europe and 
North America), this Western-style nationalism is posed as “civic, ratio-
nal, and benign”; while its Eastern counterpart as “irrational, ethnic” 
and simply “bad.” It is a reflection of the classical dichotomy of civic 
(good) and ethnic (bad) nationalism.40 
Civic, Ethnic?
Obviously, this dichotomy—as it is well known—is heavily value-laden, 
and guilty of “orientalizing” the East, while positioning the West (or 
“us” from the vantage of most authors commenting on this dichotomy) 
in the center of rational thinking, from where to opine about the rest 
of the world.41 Apart from this subjective bent, the typical discussion 
on nationalism is limited to Europe, as if all the other polities extant 
across the present-day world were not nation-states (apart from the rare 
exception of the Vatican City State).
When civic nationalism is indubitably connected to the institution 
of citizenship, there is not an easily observable equal trait on which eth-
nic nationalism would be based. Ethnicity is a legion of things, basically 
any set or constellation of cultural traits employed by a group to define, 
justify, and maintain its cohesion. When a group of this kind claims to 
be a nation, and this claim is recognized by already existing nations (de 
facto only by those endowed with their own nation-states), its ethnicity 
and its state-making usages become “ethnic nationalism.” In such an 
understanding of nationalism, “nation” is the highest political title a 
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human group can gain in today’s world (not unlike the title of professor 
among scholars). This title gives a group distinguished in this manner 
a legitimate right to seek statehood.
Language and Nationalism
One of the elements of culture frequently identified with ethnic nation-
alism is language. It is especially true of the practice of nation- and 
nation-state building and maintenance in Central Europe beginning 
in the early twentieth century. Thus, the Polish nation and state are 
correlated with the Polish language, the Macedonian nation and state 
with the Macedonian language, and the Norwegian nation and state with 
the Norwegian language. This coupling of nationalism with language 
as its very basis—which had its precedents in the Italian peninsula and 
in Germany—became typical of Central Europe. For the sake of clarity, 
I propose to dub this kind of nationalism prevalent in the region as 
“ethnolinguistic,” rather than merely “ethnic.”
Strangely, many (if not most) theoretical and classical works on 
nationalism draw on Central Europe, and generalize with the use of 
examples from this region on this ideology of politicized groupness and 
state formation. But if the occurrence of ethnolinguistic nationalism is 
limited to Central Europe, conclusions and generalizations distilled on 
the basis of cases taken from this region may not be of much explanatory 
value for the rest of the world, where ethnolinguistic nationalism is 
unknown or not practiced in any politically salient manner.
Inventing Nations, States, and Languages
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger famously remarked that nations 
are invented, or imagined (Benedict Anderson’s term)42 into being.43 
Nations are imagined through history, the printing press (or “print cap-
italism”), religion, politics, national movements, newspapers, books, 
educational systems, conscript armies, state bureaucracies, and the like. 
But this invented character of nations is not exclusively specific to them. 
States are also invented or imagined in a similar manner as “spatial 
containers” in which members of a specific group (nowadays, a nation) 
have the right to live, and all the others are “foreigners” to be kept out, 
or at best temporarily tolerated. The spatiality of the state is most visibly 
manifested in its border, being an irregular loop that delimits the state’s 
“territorial body” and separates it from all the other extant polities.
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I propose to see languages in a similar light, as invented, especially 
those that are “reduced to writing,” defined, regularized, “stabilized,” 
and bounded with officially approved dictionaries, grammars, spelling 
manuals, encyclopedias, and other authoritative publications. All these 
features are hallmarks of the process of language standardization. In 
its course, a predefined fragment of the naturally continuous linguis-
tic dimension is cut out and separated to be fashioned into a discrete 
entity known as a language. This language is imparted in a formalized 
(“standard”) way through the educational system, the state bureaucracy, 
the press, and the like to “its” target population (nation), and then suc-
cessively from one generation to another.
Historians and scholars realize that states are formed, maintained, 
and destroyed, and that even once upon a time there were no states 
(in the modern sense of this term) at all. But in this national age of 
nowadays, people trust that despite their individual mortality they may 
live in the memory and in the collective body of “their”—rhetorically 
immortal—nation. Hence, it is painfully difficult to concede that human 
groups (whether dubbed nations or not) emerge, exist, and disappear, in 
much the same way as states do. But often it is nearly impossible to argue 
the same for languages, despite much literature on the phenomenon 
of “language death” (that is, on the disappearance of languages, their 
falling out of use). Even scholars prefer to see languages anthropomor-
phically in terms of “families,” in which “parent languages” “give birth” 
to “daughter languages.”44 Languages appear immutably “natural” and 
“immortal,” due to the fact that people employ them all the time for 
bonding and communicating within a given speech community. As a 
result, it is often difficult to take a step back and calmly observe that 
languages are human creations, mere artifacts of culture; made, used, 
and discarded at (a group’s) will. It is especially true of written standard 
languages, walled away from all others by a mass of legislation, official-
dom, and printed matter.
But let me mention several examples that aptly illustrate the man-
made character of languages as artifacts of culture. In the interwar 
period there were such languages—now unjustifiably forgotten—as 
Czechoslovak and Serbocroatoslovenian. The former comprised two 
varieties, namely Czech and Slovak.45 The same was true of Serbo-
croatoslovenian composed of Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian.46 Both 
the languages are long gone, though Norwegian continues in a similarly 
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composite fashion, comprising Nynorsk (“New Norwegian”) and Bok-
mål (“Book Language”).47 Although Greek is assumed to be a unitary 
language with a three-millennia-long history, for all practical purposes, 
an educated Greek wishing to function fluently in all the registers of 
this language as employed nowadays must master Demotic (vernacular 
Greek, official only since 1976) and Katharevousa (“purified language”) 
in which much literature and most documents were written during the 
last two centuries, alongside New Testament and Ancient Greek used 
for liturgy in church and literary flourishes.48 
Languages, like states, can break up into successors, as vividly exem-
plified by the recent split of Serbo-Croatian into Bosnian, Croatian, 
Montenegrin, and Serbian.49 The popular definition claims that dia-
lects are mutually intelligible forms of language (lects), while languages 
are their mutually unintelligible counterparts.50 But some dialects of 
Chinese are as mutually incomprehensible as Polish and German;51 on 
the contrary, the Moldovan and Romanian languages are exactly the 
same,52 and the four post-Serbo-Croatian languages hardly differ from 
one another.53
The Normative Isomorphism of Language, Nation, and States
Despite the importance of language for Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic 
nationalisms, so often pointed to in literature on nationalism, I have not 
encountered a precise definition of this type of nationalism that would 
allow for a focused analysis and wide-ranging comparisons. Thus, I 
propose to operationalize the concept of ethnolinguistic nationalism by 
defining this ideology through the actual observed practices of nation-
state building and maintenance in Central Europe.
These practices, politically and socially normative in their character, 
tend to maintain that a “true and legitimate” nation-state is that whose 
territory is inhabited by the speakers of one language only. This—by 
default, national—language cannot be shared with any other state or 
nation. The language’s speakers are defined as a nation. Furthermore, 
the nation-state’s territory must not house any autonomous entities 
with official languages different than the national one. And by the same 
token no autonomous entities with the nation-state’s national language 
as official can exist outside this national polity. As a result, where the 
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program has been fulfilled, it leads to a tight spatial and ideological 
(symbolical) overlapping of language, nation, and state. I dub this foun-
dational mechanism of ethnolinguistic nationalism as the “normative 
isomorphism of language, nation, and state.”54 
Below I attempt to show how the proposed analytical instrument of 
the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state may be put 
to work for tracing the emergence and the subsequent spread of the 
model of ethnolinguistic nation-state through time and across Central 
Europe. Furthermore, I reflect on how the outcomes of such an analysis 
may yield a definition of Central Europe. Like any other, this analytical 
instrument of normative isomorphism has its own inherent limitations. 
I identify them and suggest how a nuancing of the data generated with 
its use can be conducted in order to limit distortions in the outcomes 
of analyses produced with the employment of the instrument.
The Diachronic Perspective
The first fully isomorphic (ethnolinguistic) nation-states appeared in 
the Balkans in the late nineteenth century. This phenomenon happened 
before normative isomorphism became the basic method of nation-state 
building and of national statehood legitimation and maintenance in 
Central Europe after World War I. I focus on the period between 1864 
and 1913 in a series of selected annual snapshots in table 1, below. In bold 
I give names of new isomorphic states that appeared in a given year (or a 
bit earlier, when falling between two ranges), while in the third column 
I indicate names of some polities that lost their isomorphic status, the 
cause of such an occurrence briefly alluded to in brackets.
Table 1. Isomorphic states in Central Europe, 1864–1913.
Year Isomorphic States
Number of  
Isomorphic States
1864 Greece 1
1866 Greece, Romania 2
1885 Bulgaria, Romania 2 Greece [Cyprus]
1905 Bulgaria, Norway, Romania 3
1913 Albania, Bulgaria, Norway, Romania 4
Note: Bold type indicates new states for a particular year.
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Greece, as the first state ever, began to fulfill the requirements of 
the normative isomorphism, thanks to the 1864 union with the United 
States of the Ionian Islands. Previously the two polities had shared 
Greek as their official language, a situation that prevented them from 
becoming isomorphic. The last stage of the process of the creation of the 
Romanian nation-state lasted between 1859 and 1866, when the princi-
palities of Moldavia and Wallachia were transformed into a single polity 
with the novel name of Romania, and Romanian as its sole official and 
national language. In 1878 Bulgaria became de facto independent from 
the Ottoman Empire, and having instituted Bulgarian as its exclusive 
official and national language, almost joined the ranks of the isomorphic 
club, but for the Ottoman autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia, 
with Bulgarian as one of its official languages. Bulgaria finally reached 
the ideal of normative isomorphism seven years later, when it annexed 
this autonomous province. 
In the year of the founding of Bulgaria (1878), Greece lost its iso-
morphic status due to the making of Ottoman Cyprus into a British 
protectorate with Greek as one of its official languages. In the last 
decade preceding World War I, Norway and Albania gained indepen-
dence, respectively, from Denmark in 1905 and the Ottoman Empire in 
1912/1913. Both polities, the former with Norwegian and the latter with 
Albanian as the official and national languages, fashioned themselves 
into ethnolinguistic nation-states that fulfilled the principles of norma-
tive isomorphism.
It appears that the model of ethnolinguistic nation-state meeting all 
the strictures of normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state 
emerged in the Balkans. Perhaps it happened so because of the gradual 
replacement of religion with language as the ideological basis of Balkan 
nationalisms. This change took place, probably, under the stimulating 
examples of the founding of such successful polities as the Kingdom of 
Italy and the German Empire. They were established as ethnolinguis-
tic nation-states aspiring to become “homes” for all Italians (meaning 
Italian speakers) and for all Germans (meaning, German speakers) in 
1861 and 1871, respectively.
World War I destroyed the nonnational multiethnic empires of Cen-
tral Europe—namely, Austria-Hungary, the Russian Empire, and the 
Ottoman Empire. The Western Allies at the peace conference in Paris 
replaced them with nation-states explicitly defined in ethnolinguistic 
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terms. In this way, the normative isomorphism “moved” northward (see 
table 2 below). The freshly established Ukraine joined the ranks of the 
isomorphic national polities in late 1917 only to be “booted out” from 
the club the following year when another Ukrainian polity (Western 
Ukraine) emerged in Galicia. Both Ukrainian states united in the 1919 
Zluka (or Act of Union), and thus this new joint Ukrainian nation-state 
regained its isomorphic status. (In the table’s middle rubric on “Iso-
morphic States,” I include in braces brief information on why a given 
polity regained its previously lost isomorphic status.)
A similar development can be observed in the case of Romania 
which, between 1917 and 1918, ceased to be an isomorphic state fol-
lowing the rise of the Moldavian Democratic Republic in the former 
Russian province of Bessarabia. Both Romanian-speaking polities con-
tracted a union in 1918, meaning that in the 1919 row Romania is again 
a fully isomorphic polity.
Table 2. Isomorphic states in Central Europe, 1916–1920.
Year Isomorphic States
Number of
Isomorphic States
1916 Albania, Bulgaria, Norway, Romania 4
1917 Albania, Bulgaria, Norway, Ukraine 4 Romania [Moldova]
1918 Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, 
Poland
9 Ukraine [West Ukraine]
1919 Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Norway, Poland, Romania {Moldova 
incorporated}, Ukraine {Zluka}
8 Belarus [defunct], 
Hungary [Red Slovakia], 
Lithuania [Perloja] 
1920 Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Norway, 
Romania, Ukraine 
9 Poland [Red Galicia]
Note: Bold type indicates new states for a particular year.
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The Soviet onslaught extinguished Belarus as a nation-state at the 
turn of 1919. In June a short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic with Slovak 
and Hungarian as its official languages was founded, which nullified the 
isomorphic status of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Likewise, Lithu-
ania and Poland were pushed out from the set of isomorphic polities; 
the former polity, due to the rise of the nonnational village Republic 
of Perloja (1918–23) with Lithuanian as its official language. The same 
purpose was served by the Galician Soviet Socialist Republic in the case 
of Poland. The Soviets established this short-lived socialist republic 
with Ukrainian, Polish, and Yiddish as its official languages in the course 
of the Polish-Soviet War (1919–21). Last but not least, although Czecho-
slovakia entered the political map of Europe in 1918, it achieved the 
ideal of the normative isomorphism only two years later, when its two 
official languages of Czech and Slovak were replaced with a single one 
under the name of Czechoslovak. It consisted of two varieties, namely, 
the aforementioned Czech and Slovak.
This brief and rather simplistic overview of the changes in the 
political shape of Central Europe—as seen through the lens of the ana-
lytical instrument of normative isomorphism of language, nation, and 
state—reveals two phenomena: first, the high volatility of the political 
organization of this section of the continent in the wake of World War 
I; and second, the spread of ethnolinguistic nationalism as the sole 
legitimate and popularly accepted ideology of nation-state building 
and statehood legitimation across Central Europe. The new political 
situation stabilized in the mid-1920s, and from table 3 below it becomes 
clear that during the interwar period normative isomorphism was the 
standard of statehood organization in Central Europe. We can con-
clude—in broad strokes—that ethnolinguistic nationalism became the 
very defining feature of Central Europe as a specific region.
Lithuania rejoined the isomorphic club on the disbanding of the 
Republic of Perloja in 1923, when Poland officially annexed the Wilno 
(Vilnius) region where this village statelet was located. In 1929 Yugo-
slavia became isomorphic as a result of the royal coup that effected the 
replacement of the country’s former trinominal name of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which proposed the polity was a home to 
the three nations. Afterward, on the ideological plane of nationalism, the 
country’s population was construed as the Yugoslav nation with its offi-
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cial Serbocroatoslovenian language, popularly (though never officially) 
dubbed as “Yugoslavian.” Poland was excluded from the isomorphic 
table through 1938 on the account of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist 
Republic with Belarusian, Russian, Yiddish, and Polish as its official 
languages. In 1938 the two latter languages were decommissioned in 
this role, which opened the way for Poland back to the isomorphic club.
The dramatic events of 1938–39 that preceded the outbreak of 
World War II meant the disappearance of Czechoslovakia, dismembered 
at the hands of Germany, Hungary, and Poland. However, Germany 
decided to make use of the anti-Czech sentiment among the Slovaks 
and coaxed the Slovak elite into proclaiming an isomorphic Slovak 
national polity in 1939.
I could continue with this diachronic outline of Central European 
history from the vantage of normative isomorphism, but I am sure 
that this sample already shows the strengths and weaknesses of this 
approach. Below, I address the latter and propose certain ways in which 
their distorting effect on the data can be ameliorated. 
Table 3. Isomorphic states in Central Europe, 1926–1939.
Year Isomorphic States
Number of Isomorphic 
States
1926 Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Romania
9 Ukraine [defunct]
1929 Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Romania, Yugoslavia
10
1938 Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, 
Yugoslavia
9 Czechoslovakia 
[defunct]
1939 Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Yugoslavia
11
Note: Bold type indicates new states for a particular year.
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Only Isomorphic Polities?
At the fall of communism in 1989, there were only three isomorphic 
nation-states in Central Europe: Bulgaria, Norway, and Poland. The 
number of such polities was seriously diminished with the federaliza-
tion of Czechoslovakia in 1969 and of Yugoslavia in 1974. In federal 
Yugoslavia, Serbia’s Autonomous Province of Kosovo received Alba-
nian as another official language alongside Serbo-Croatian. A similar 
development was observed in Serbia’s other Autonomous Province of 
Vojvodina, where apart from the state language of Serbo-Croatian, the 
following languages became co-official: Hungarian, Romanian, Rusyn, 
and Slovak.
In light of the analytical instrument of normative isomorphism, the 
elevation of Albanian, Hungarian, and Romanian to official status in 
Vojvodina, by default disqualified Albania, Hungary, and Romania as 
isomorphic polities (see table 4). By the same token, all three nation-
states regained their isomorphic status when the autonomous status of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina was abolished in 1990. Likewise, when Czecho-
slovakia split in 1993 into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the then 
already defunct official use of Slovak in Serbia’s Vojvodina could not 
prevent Slovakia from fulfilling normative isomorphism. The situation 
changed dramatically again in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
In 2008 Kosovo became an independent polity with Albanian and 
Serbian as its official languages, and two years later Serbia reinstated 
the autonomous status of Vojvodina, complete with the co-official use 
of Croatian, Hungarian, Romanian, Rusyn, Serbian, and Slovak. The 
changes disqualified Albania, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia from 
the isomorphic club, though it does not mean that legislators in distant 
Prishtina/Priština and Belgrade in any way made the four nation-states 
abandon their respective ethnolinguistic nationalisms. These polities 
still stuck to their respective ethnolinguistic national programs, and 
hardly took any note of administrative and legal changes in Serbia’s 
Vojvodina.
The volatility observed in the number of isomorphic polities is 
caused by a blind spot in the analytical instrument, namely its principle 
that when polities or autonomous territories outside a given isomor-
phic nation-state proclaim that same nation-state’s national language 
as official, they automatically strip the nation-state in question of its 
isomorphic status. In today’s world such a nation-state may do nothing 
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to prevent such a development, limited by the principle of sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, a sudden drop in the number of isomorphic states detected 
with the analytical instrument of normative isomorphism usually does 
not reflect any drop in the political and social importance of ethnolin-
guistic nationalism across Central Europe. Hence, in order to stress the 
point, apart from the “states fulfilling isomorphism,” I have introduced 
the additional category of “states aspiring to isomorphism” (see table 6), 
The latter are frequently prevented from attaining the ideal of normative 
isomorphism by developments outside their borders.
I propose that only groups of isomorphic states and near-isomor-
phic states, when taken together, aptly reflect the territorial spread of 
ethnolinguistic nationalism at any given moment.
Let us return for a moment to table 4. Apart from the loss of 
autonomy in Kosovo and Vojvodina, the breakups of the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia also were responsible for the steep rise 
Table 4. Isomorphic states in Central Europe, 1989–1993.
Year Isomorphic States
Number of Isomorphic 
States
1989 Bulgaria, Norway, Poland 3
1990 Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Norway, 
Poland, Romania {autonomy abolished 
in Vojvodina & Kosovo}
6
1991 Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Romania 
Slovenia, Ukraine
14 
1992 Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Norway Poland, Romania, Slovenia
12 Croatia [Bosnia], 
Ukraine [Crimea] 
1993 Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Norway Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
14
Note: Bold type indicates new states for a particular year.
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in the number of isomorphic polities. As a rule of thumb, almost each 
and every post-Soviet, post-Yugoslav, and post-Czechoslovak successor 
nation-state embraced ethnolinguistic nationalism and aspired to meet 
the requirements of the normative isomorphism. The entailed normative 
insistence on having to possess its own unique national language not 
shared with any other polity caused the split of Yugoslavia’s Serbo- 
Croatian into the successor languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montene-
grin, and Serbian. 
In 1992 Croatia and Ukraine disappeared from the ranks of the 
isomorphic nation-states in Central Europe. In the case of the former 
polity it happened in the wake of Bosnian independence because the 
new state adopted Croatian as a co-official language. On the contrary, 
the disqualification of Ukraine took place, due to the introduction of 
autonomy for Crimea, complete with the status of co-official languages 
for Crimean Tatar and Russian. 
The Complication of European Integration
The tradition of extensive multiethnic non-, or more appropriately, 
a-national polities, so typical in Central Europe prior to 1914, returned to 
the region in a substantial manner with the successive eastward enlarge-
ments of the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007.55 Obviously, some 
may disagree with my opinion, denying any degree of statehood to the 
EU, which they choose to see as another international organization. I 
beg to differ on this issue.
Hence, should we decide to treat the EU as an anational polity, its 
very existence may point to a future limiting of the ideological impor-
tance of ethnolinguistic nationalism across Central Europe. From 
such a vantage point, in 2007, the number of isomorphic nation-states 
may be reduced from as many as 14 to as few as 4 (see table 5 below). 
Obviously, such a statistical outcome is a result of a specific application 
of the analytical instrument of normative isomorphism of language, 
nation and state. It should not make us blind to the fact that Central 
Europe’s isomorphic nation-states do exist, even after having become 
EU members, and at least for the time being their influence on the life 
and beliefs of their respective populations appears to be stronger than 
that of the EU’s own institutions. But, with time, given the organization’s 
continued existence and growing influence, an EU that becomes more 
“state-like” may indicate a future waning in importance of ethnolinguis-
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tic nationalism for the construction, legitimation and maintenance of 
polities in Central Europe.
Coming from the essentially unknowable future back to the present, 
in table 6 I provide a nuanced look at all of Central Europe’s 35 polities 
extant in 2007. I analyze their ideological character through the lens of 
normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. But this analysis 
is no longer limited to isomorphic nation-states alone. The table also 
contains the near-isomorphic nation-states, whereas the non-isomor-
phic polities are split into two further categories of “other ethnolin-
guistic states” and “non-ethnolinguistic states.” The former group is 
comprised of the nation-states that use language for some ideological 
purposes; however, it does not constitute the sole basis of their national 
statehood. The set of non-ethnolinguistic states includes all the other 
Table 5. Isomorphic states in Central Europe after 2004.
Year Isomorphic States
Number of  
Isomorphic  
States
2004 Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Norway Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia
13
2004 (European Union 
treated as a single, non-
ethnolinguistic polity)
Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Norway, 
Romania
5
2007 Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
14
2007 (European Union 
treated as a single, non-
ethnolinguistic polity)
Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Norway
4
Table 6. Central Europe’s isomorphic and other polities in 2007.
States fulfilling isomorphism Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
[14]
States aspiring to fulfill isomorphism Bosnia, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Moldova, Northern Cyprus, Serbia, 
Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine
[13]
Other ethnolinguistic states Austria, Belarus, Denmark, 
Liechtenstein
[4]
Non-ethnolinguistic states Mount Athos, Russian Federation, 
Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and 
Dheleia, Transnistria
[4]
Total number of analyzed polities 35
Percentage of isomorphic states in the 
total of analyzed polities
40%
Isomorphic states and states aspiring 
to fulfill isomorphism combined, 
expressed as a percentage of the total of 
analyzed polities
77%
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polities to which the logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism is nearly or 
completely alien.
Of course, this article is too short to let me substantiate at length 
why I have assigned this or that polity to a specific rubric. And, yes, such 
a classification to a degree may be arbitrary and questionable in bor-
derline cases. Other authors may want to rearrange their table slightly 
or even substantially. I do not claim that the analytical instrument of 
normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state is perfect in its 
detection of ethnolinguistic nationalism. It may, however, help interested 
researchers and observers compare the spread, influence, and other 
dynamics of ethnolinguistic nationalism on the plane of extant polities.
Bearing this caveat in mind, I propose that the actual extent and 
influence of ethnolinguistic nationalism in Central Europe may be 
measured only by taking into consideration both the fully isomorphic 
and near-isomorphic polities. In 2007 the two groups comprised 27 
nation-states, or about 77 percent of all Central Europe’s polities.
Populations and Languages
But states, which vary widely in demographic size and territory, are far 
from being the ideal unit of analysis and comparison themselves. In 
order to lessen the distortion entailed, I included the populations of 
the states covered in the analysis (see table 7). From this demographic 
perspective, although the number of the isomorphic nation-states in 
2007 amounted to circa 50 percent of Central Europe’s polities, their 
populations total a mere 27 percent of the region’s inhabitants. But 
the populations of the isomorphic and near-isomorphic nation-states 
combined, at 86 percent, decisively surpassed the corresponding per-
centage of the isomorphic and near-isomorphic nation-states among 
Central Europe’s polities.
Hence, I daresay that nowadays almost the entire population of Cen-
tral Europe (barring roughly 10 percent) live in the region’s isomorphic 
and near-isomorphic nation-states. As such these people are exposed to 
the influence and workings of the normative isomorphism of language, 
nation and state, which they imbibe in the course of their everyday life, 
be it at school, from the mass media, or through interacting with the 
state bureaucracy. In such a way, in their minds ethnolinguistic nation-
alism becomes a “transparent category,” the very synonym of “political 
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normalcy.” For the inhabitants of the isomorphic and near-isomorphic 
countries the “normal,” “genuine,” and legitimate polity is an ethno-
linguistic nation-state that meets all the requirements of the normative 
isomorphism of language, nation, and state. The deep entrenchment 
of this normative belief in the vast majority of peoples’ minds across 
Central Europe perpetuates the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism 
as the very basis of the political order in the region.
Table 7. Normative isomorphism and population (in millions)  
in Central Europe (2007).
Population of the states fulfilling 
isomorphism
112.53
Population of the states aspiring to 
fulfill isomorphism
245.16
Population of other ethnolinguistic 
states
23.29
Population of the non-ethnolinguistic 
states
35.07
Population of all analyzed polities 416.32
Percentage of the population of 
isomorphic states out of the total 
population of analyzed polities
27%
Population of the isomorphic states 
and of states aspiring to fulfill the 
isomorphism combined, expressed as 
a percentage of the total population of 
the analyzed polities
86%
440 kamusella
In table 8, I present how the data on the isomorphic nation-states in 
Central Europe may be viewed through the lens of languages ordered 
according to the typical “genetic” classification. At seven, the number of 
Slavic languages employed in the fully isomorphic nation-states adds up 
to half of all the isomorphic languages. However, it goes without saying 
that the outcome of such an analytical exercise would be different if the 
official and national languages of the near-isomorphic nation-states 
were taken into account, as shown in table 9. Furthermore, bearing in 
mind the imagined character of languages as discrete entities, it must 
be pointed out that the observed high number of the isomorphic and 
near-isomorphic Slavic languages was also caused by the breakup of 
Serbo-Croatian replaced by as many as four “successor languages” 
employed for nation-building purposes.
Table 8. National (“isomorphic”) languages of Central Europe’s  
isomorphic nation-states in 2007: “Genetic” classification.
Family Languages Total
Slavic Bulgarian (C), Czech (L), Macedonian 
(C), Montenegrin (C & L), Polish (L), 
Slovak (L), Slovenian (L)
7
Baltic Latvian (L), Lithuanian (L) 2
Finno-Ugric (non-
Indo-European)
Estonian (L), Hungarian (L) 2
Germanic Norwegian (L) 1
Romance Romanian (L) 1
Isolate 
Indo-European
Albanian (L) 1
Note: The parenthetical labels (C) and (L) indicate that the language is written  
in Cyrillic or Latin characters.
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A more equal (thus, balanced?) distribution of the isomorphic 
languages of different categories can be obtained with the use of one 
of the alternative areal classifications (see table 10). Areal classification, 
apart from the purely linguistic features, also takes into consideration 
extralinguistic elements of culture and politics. The assumption is that 
purely linguistic affiliations among languages may change or be even 
dramatically altered by vast and long-lasting political and social changes. 
That is why English, which in its origins and grammar is a Germanic 
language, is also to a degree a Romance language, due to the political 
importance first of Latin and subsequently of French, and under the 
influence of the intimate political relations between England and France 
that lasted for many centuries.
Table 9. National (“near-isomorphic”) languages of Central Europe’s 
near-isomorphic nation-states in 2007: “Genetic” classification.
Family Languages Total
Slavic Bosnian (L), Croatian (L), Serbian 
(C), Ukrainian (C)
4
Germanic German (L), Luxembourgish (L), 
Swedish (L)
3
Romance French (L), Moldovan (L) 2
Finno-Ugric (non-
Indo-European)
Finnish (L) 1
Turkic (non-Indo-
European)
Turkish (L) 1
Isolate 
Indo-European
Greek (G) 1
Note: The parenthetical labels (C) and (L), and (G) indicate that the language is 
written in Cyrillic, Latin, or Greek letters.
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Similar development may be gleaned from table 10. The Balkan 
linguistic area is a reflection of the two millennia of cohabitation among 
the speakers of a variety of languages in the (East) Roman Empire 
(so-called Byzantium) and then in the Ottoman Empire. Likewise, 
the Central European linguistic area is the legacy of the intimate links 
among the crowns of Bohemia, Hungary, Austria, and—to a degree—of 
Poland-Lithuania. They became more coherent and permanent under 
the rule of the Habsburgs, first in their hereditary lands, afterward 
overhauled into an Austrian Empire that, in turn, reinvented itself as 
Austria-Hungary. Last but not least, the Circum-Baltic linguistic areas 
is a reflection of the Hansa, the Kalmar Union of Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden and, finally, of Sweden’s short-lived Baltic empire.
For all the multiethnic and nonnational empires gone after World 
War I, their legacy remains in the form of the isomorphic nation-states. 
Table 10. National (“isomorphic”) languages of Central Europe’s 
isomorphic nation-states in 2007: Areal classification.
Linguistic Areas Languages Total
Central European Czech (L), Hungarian (L), Slovak (L), 
Slovenian (L)
4
C. European and 
Balkan, overlapping
Montenegrin (C & L) 1
Balkan Albanian (L), Bulgarian (C), 
Macedonian (C), Romanian (L)
4
Circum-Baltic Estonian (L), Latvian (L), Lithuanian 
(L), Norwegian (L)
4
Eurasian Polish (L) 1
Note: The parenthetical labels (C) and (L), and (G) indicate that the language is 
written in Cyrillic, Latin, or Greek letters.
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With time, it may lead to a growing degree of similarity among the 
languages. In turn, this could prompt a proposition of embracing most 
of these languages in an enlarged Central European linguistic area.
Looking Further Afield
Having embarked on the analysis of the normative isomorphism of 
language, nation, and state, initially I thought that the sole group of 
ethnolinguistic nation-states occurs in Central Europe. I saw ethno-
linguistic polities popping up outside Central Europe, as for instance, 
Iceland (with its specific national language of Icelandic, not shared 
with any other polity or nation), Turkmenistan (with Turkmen), Bhu-
tan (with Dongka), or the Maldives (with Maldivian) as rare oddities, 
outliers, a result of accidents and other random exigencies of history, 
and not of any concentrated ideological plan as in Central Europe (the 
Indian “linguistic states” founded after 1955 are—still—part of the same 
Federation).56
But then, when I rather idly browsed the globe for further isomor-
phic polities, regularities began to emerge. First, I noticed that these 
“oddities” of ethnolinguistc national statehood are limited to Eurasia 
only. At present no isomorphic or near-isomorphic nation-states seem 
to exist in Africa or in the Americas, where local ethnolinguistic cultures 
were either wiped out or permanently submerged by the succession 
of Western colonialism and imperialism, and then by decolonization, 
which in most cases decided to retain European languages as official 
and even as national.
These realizations made me stop and think. I scanned all the 
world’s extant states in regard to their official language policies, and 
then was surprised to find out that another group of ethnolinguistic 
nation-states that appear to fulfill the strict requirements of normative 
isomorphism of language, nation, and state is located in Southeast and 
East (SE/E) Asia. Tentatively, due to my as yet limited understanding 
of language politics in these polities, I include in this SE/E Asian group 
of isomorphic nation-states the following: Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, 
Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. Malaysia would almost make 
it into this group, but for the co-official use of Malaysian in Brunei and 
Singapore. Likewise Korea could be an isomorphic polity, if it were 
444 kamusella
not divided into two and Korean were not used for official purposes in 
China’s Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture.
I hypothesize that the transfer of ideas and practices of the normative 
isomorphism of language, nation, and state was from (Central) Europe 
to SE/E Asia, not the other way around. Tentatively, I propose to check 
the following three possible channels of transmission of relevant ideas. 
First, from Prussia (which successfully turned itself into the ideologi-
cally ethnolinguistic German Empire in 1871) to Japan, and from Japan 
elsewhere in SE/A Asia.57 Second, from France (where the program of 
ethnolinguistic homogenization of this nation-state has been continually 
carried out since the French Revolution)58 to its colonies in Indochina, 
and indirectly to Thailand and Malaysia.59 And, third, from the Soviet 
Union (where internal administrative organization of this communist 
polity was carried out alongside ethnolinguistic lines) and the Soviet 
bloc (mostly composed of isomorphic or near-isomorphic nation-states) 
to the communist polities and movements across SE/E Asia.60 
Interestingly, and perhaps saliently, almost all of today’s fully 
isomorphic states in Central Europe and SE/E Asia experienced or 
still are experiencing communism. Partial exceptions to this norm are 
Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, and Norway. But in the case of Indone-
sia communism was part and parcel of the postcolonial nation-state’s 
politics and social life till the 1965 genocide of communists and their 
families.61 However, all the isomorphic polities in Central Europe and 
SE/E Asia, with the lone exception of Norway, experienced or still are 
experiencing authoritarianism of this or that hue. And last but not least, 
prior to their emergence all the isomorphic polities were part of larger 
states, or were either seized or indirectly dominated (which was the fate 
of Japan and Thailand) by Western colonial empires, especially in the 
case of SE/E Asia.
As shown in table 11, the number of the polities fulfilling normative 
isomorphism in SE/E Asia is half that in Central Europe. Neverthe-
less, the influence of ethnolinguistic nationalism may be—at least, in 
a long-term perspective—wider in SE/E Asia than in Central Europe, 
given that five times more people live in SE/E Asia’s isomorphic polities 
than in Central Europe’s isomorphic nation-states. A further, in-depth 
investigation into the origins of the SE/E Asian cluster of the isomorphic 
nation-states and its probable links with its Central European counter-
part is needed. It would require a wide-ranging collaborative research 
project carried out by an interdisciplinary team of scholars.
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